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Article 2

LOSING THE PAPER - MORTGAGE
ASSIGNMENTS, NOTE TRANSFERS AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Alan M White

In

ABSTRACT

this article, I survey the state of the mortgage loan transfer
system, the legal rules that govern it, and the widening gap
between those rules and the practices in the secondary mortgage
market just prior to the 2008 crisis. The review includes some
empirical assessment of the extent of errors and execution problems;
the damage done by "robo-signing;" the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System ("MERS") and note delivery practices; and the
extent to which courts will prevent or reverse foreclosure sales based
on those errors and problems. I then examine why existing legal
structures, for both paper-based and electronic transfers, are not
working, and the extent to which they have failed, I also identify the
key consumer and investor protection values and interests (finality,
transparency, fraud protection, and so forth) that must be addressed
by the law governing secondary market transfers of home loans. I
conclude by outlining options for reforming the mortgage loan
transfer system, including the use of a single document merging the
note and mortgage, and a structure for the registration of a single
authoritative electronic version of the mortgage/note and of all
changes in parties to, and terms of, the transaction.

Professor of Law, Valparaiso Law School. Special thanks to Whitney
Dickison, Christopher Erickson and Anne Zygaldo for their invaluable assistance
with the MERS foreclosure record survey and with additional legal research.
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INTRODUCTION
Five years into the subprime mortgage crisis,' the foreclosure
machinery has slowed to a crawl.2 Historically high levels of
mortgage defaults continue to overwhelm the foreclosure system. At
the same time, 2010 and 2011 saw a second wave of the foreclosure
crisis, brought on in part by relatively obscure legal rules that govern
the transfer of mortgage loans from one lender to another and the
shortcuts to circumvent those rules. Those shortcuts have come to be
known as the "robo-signing" scandal. 4 Robo-signing describes
1 Also termed the global financial crisis ("GFC"), or the Great Recession, the
financial collapse of 2008 was precipitated by rapidly escalating defaults and
foreclosures on subprime mortgage loans in the United States, and by the resulting
losses experienced by investors in those mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.
See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011) (delving into

the history and causes of the global financial crisis); ROBERT J. SCHILLER, THE
SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND

WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2008) (providing similar analysis as to the background of

the global financial).
2 See 2011 Year-End Foreclosure Report:. Foreclosures on the Retreat,
REALTYTRAC (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosuremarket-report/2011-year-end-foreclosure-market-report-6984 (reporting that the
average foreclosure in 2011 took 348 days to complete, and more than 1,000 days
to complete in New York).
See Mary Ellen Podmolik, ForeclosureProcess Caught in State Bottleneck,
CHI. TRIB., Sep. 22, 2011, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-0922/business/ct-biz-0922-foreclose-20110922_1 foreclosure-auctions-foreclosurecase-foreclosure-filings.
4 See U.S.
FORECLOSURES

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
DOCUMENTATION

OFFICE, GAO-i 1-433, MORTGAGE

PROBLEMS

REVEAL

NEED

FOR

ONGOING

at
2011),
available
(May
OVERSIGHT
REGULATORY
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317923.pdf; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, EXAMINING
MORTGAGE
OF
CONSEQUENCES
THE
IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE MITIGATION (Nov.

fittp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRTat
2010),
available
16,
111JPRT61835/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT61835.pdf; FED. RESERVE SYs., OFFICE OF
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY
[hereinafter
REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE POLICIES AND PRACTICES (2011)

"INTERAGENCY

REVIEW"],

available

at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/interagencyreview foreclos
ures_20110413.pdf The interagency review focused primarily on robo-signing of
affidavits submitted in judicial foreclosures, as well as on problems with the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). Robo-signing also refers to
high-volume signing of mortgage assignments and note endorsements, sometimes
years after the intended secondary market transfer of the mortgage loan, in
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mortgage servicers' response to the tremendous volume of mortgage
defaults and foreclosures after 2007: assembly-line signing and
notarizing of affidavits for foreclosure cases, mortgage assignments,
note allonges and related documents, all filed in courts and deed
recorders in counties across the United States. In early 2012, the state
attorneys general, together with the Federal Department of Housing
and Urban Development and other agencies, announced a settlement
with five major banks and mortgage servicers of robo-signing related
claims.5 Many hope that this settlement would not only resolve some
of the liabilities arising from robo-signing but also somehow resolve
legal questions about a variety of mortgage industry practices,
allowin§ the foreclosure process and housing markets to return to
normal.
Lying at the intersection of contract assignment and property
transfer law,. the structures and practices governing mortgage loan
transfers find themselves in a state of confusion. While the recording
and transfer of corporate debt and stock securities successfully
shifted to an electronic system in the 1970's, with legal support from
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code and relevant Securities
and Exchange Commission rules,7 the law and practice of electronic
transfers of the largest individual credit obligations, home mortgage
loans, have not yet converged. On the practice side, the Mortgage
Electronic Registration System ("MERS") came about in the 1990's
on the basis of a legal opinion letter, completely devoid of any
statutory or regulatory authority.' On the legal side, the Federal ESign statute, providing for electronic Note negotiation,9 as well as the
preparation for an impending foreclosure.
s See Jim Puzzanghera & Alejandro Lazo, Mortgage settlement is also housing
available at
2012,
Feb.
10,
TIMES,
L.A.
relief package,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/10/business/la-fi-mortgage-settlement20120210.
6 See Derek Kravitz, Questions and answers about what the foreclosure-abuse
deal will and won't do, STAR TRIB., Feb. 9, 2012, available at
http://www.startribune.com/business/139048784.html.
7 See generally Richard A. Hakes, UCC Article 8: Will the Indirect Holding of
Securities Survive the Light of Day?, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 661 (2002) (detailing
both the history and subsequent evolution of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code).
8 Christopher Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic
Registration System's Land Title Theory, 53 WM & MARY L. REV. 111, 116-17
(2011).
' 15 U.S.C.A § 7021 (West 2012) (defining "transferable records" and
authorizing electronic equivalent to a paper negotiable instrument); see also Jane K.
Winn, What Is a Transferable Record and Who Cares? 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
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Uniform Real Propert Electronic Recording Act, have lain dormant
and largely unused.1 As the volume of mortgage transfers and
foreclosures exploded, the mortgage industry was either unwilling or
unable to follow the old paper-based rules, but it had no effective
alternative to support the dematerialization of mortgage loan sales.
In this paper, I survey the state of the mortgage loan transfer
system, through a law and society lens. First, I consider empirically
how mortgage loan assignments and transfers were actually handled
during the subprime boom, and to what extent courts have actually
cast doubt on the validity of foreclosures and foreclosure sales
affected by robo-signing, MERS, and related problems. This section
includes a report on my own empirical survey of the accuracy of
MERS records. Next, I identify the key consumer and investor
protection values and interests that must be addressed in developing
new laws and practices to govern transfers of home finance
transactions. Finally, I offer a few suggestions for moving towards a
true electronic mortgage loan transfer system with full consumer
protection.

I. How WIDESPREAD ARE MORTGAGE TRANSFER DEFECTS,
AND WHAT IMPACT WILL THEY HAVE ON TITLE
STABILITY?
Most mortgage loans made between 1990 and 2007 were sold
on the secondary market, and then ultimately resold to securities
investors through a process known as securitization. 11 As a result, the
bank or mortgage company to whom the homeowner originally
promised to make payments had to assign its rights in the Note,
which is the contract promising payment, and the Mortgage, which is
the conveyance of an interest in real estate as security for the loan.
203 (2001).
10See David E. Ewan et al., It's the Message, not the Medium! Electronic
Record and Electronic Signature Rules Preserve Existing Focus of the Law on
Content, Not Medium of Recorded Land Title Instruments, 60 Bus. LAW. 1487
(2005) (advocating wider use of electronically scanned mortgage documents and
reliance on the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act).
" See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What
Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 HOUsING POL'Y DEBATE 715 (2004).
12 See Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure
States: The Ibanez Time Bomb? 16-19 (Feb. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
at
available
School),
Law
Albany
the
with
file
(on
foreclosure
to
challenges
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1968504 (discussing post-sale
deeds in non-judicial foreclosure states based on note or mortgage transfer issues).
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Each of these two assignments followed different rules, and required
the creation, endorsement and delivery of. different documents, in
order to be legally effective. If a homeowner defaults on a mortgage
loan, the party that purchased the rights to the loan will want to
enforce the mortgage by foreclosure, to obtain valid title to the home
and to sell it. Purchasers of the foreclosed home likewise will expect
that the party foreclosing and selling the house had the legal right to
do so and that the resulting title is valid and not subject to later
challenges. Invalid transfers of the mortgage or note may or may not
impair the validity of title, depending on various rules that balance
policies of accuracy and integrity against policies of finality and
certainty.
Title problems affecting the validity of foreclosures and
foreclosure sales arising from secondary market sales and
securitization of mortgage loans can be classified on three
dimensions: whether defects are in the transfer of the note or of the
mortgage, whether a foreclosure is judicial or non-judicial,1 3 and
whether a foreclosure is challenged before or after sale (or judgment
in judicial state.) What follows is a survey of actual practices used to
transfer notes and mortgages and of judicial decisions about what
happens to foreclosure sales and titles when the note and mortgage
transfers failed.
A. Transfer of Note
1. The Legal Methods Available - Article 3 and Common Law
Most judges seem to assume that mortgage notes are
negotiable instruments, and, therefore, Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code determines the ritht of a secondary market
purchaser to enforce a mortgage note. 4 The touchstone of proper
acquisition of the right to enforce a negotiable instrument is physical
delivery of the original note, endorsed by the prior payee either in
blank or to the new owner.15 In exceptional cases, a lender who has
" A bit fewer than half the states require mortgage lenders to file a court action
to foreclose and sell the mortgaged property, while the remaining states permit
foreclosure by notice and sale, i.e., non-judicial foreclosure. Id. at 30-33. ,
14 See, e.g., Eaton v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, No. SUCV201101382, 2011 WL
6379284 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 17, 2011); see also, e.g.,. Dale Whitman, How
Negotiablity Has Fouled up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do
About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737 (2010) (surveying cases that either address
negotiability or assume mortgage notes are negotiable).
15 See Gee v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 72 So. 3d 211, 213-14 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App.
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the original note and can show that it purchased the payee's rights
from the prior holder, but is nonetheless missing proper
endorsements, can also enforce a note.16 Even more exceptionally,
the note buyer can enforce the note if the note itself is missing or lost,
but it can be proven to have been in the prior owner's possession at
the time of the loss or theft. 17 These rules have led to some fairly
straightforward results denying the validity of a foreclosure when the
plaintiff or selling party does not have possession of the note,' or if
the plaintiff has the note, but the note is payable or endorsed to
someone else and there is no other evidence that the party in
possession purchased the note from the original payee. 19
If mortgage notes are not Article 3 negotiable instruments,
then presumably the common law of contracts governs their
assignment. In addition, some provisions of U.C.C. Article 9
arguably permit proof of a mortgage note transfer without
endorsement and delivery, by proving the existence of a separate
written agreement to sell the note. 20 The foreclosing party's attempt
to prove note transfer via this alternative was unsuccessful in the
Massachusetts cases, discussed below,21 and, for the most part, the
industry and the courts have looked to the traditional method of
endorsement and delivery as the preferred way for a party to prove it
is entitled to enforce the mortgage note. 22
2. How Were Notes Actually Transferred, Empirically
How mortgage notes were handled between 1990 and 2007
depended on whether the purchaser was Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or
a private-label securitizer, i.e. a commercial or investment bank
packaging mortgages and issuing mortgage-backed securities, such as
Bear Stearns. Fannie Mae's note handling procedures are detailed in
a fascinating 2006 investigative report by its law firm, Baker
Hosteteler, written in response to the complaints of a gadfly and
2011).

§ 3-301(ii) (2010).
" Id. at §§ 3-301(iii), 3-309 (2002).
18 Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Kemp), 440 B.R. 624
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2010) (disallowing bankruptcy claim when note was neither
endorsed nor delivered); see infra note 40.
19 See, e.g., In re Deed of Adams, 693 S.E.2d 705 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
20 Renuart, supra note 12, at 24-25.
21 See infra notes 109-113 and accompanying
text.
22 For a thorough discussion of Article 3 and Article 9
note transfer law, see
Veal v. Am. Home Mortg., Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 908-13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2011).
16 U.C.C.
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shareholder, Nye Lavalle.2 3 According to the report, Fannie Mae's
policy was to have loan originators endorse all mortgage notes in
blank, converting them to bearer paper.24 The notes would then be
delivered to one of three places: the Fannie Mae storage facility in
Herndon, Virginia; to one of 58 certified independent custody agents;
or to the mortgage servicer. 25 From these facilities, Fannie Mae could
then provide the notes to lenders or foreclosing attorneys in states
whose law required it ("Original Note States") for foreclosure, to
lenders who requested all original notes to be returned upon
liquidation (payment in full or foreclosure). Otherwise, Fannie Mae
destroyed the notes ninety days after the loan was reported liquidated
on its electronic reporting system.26 However, at the time of the
report, Fannie Mae had no central reporting or inventory of lost
notes. Fannie Mae's own custodian reported fewer than 200 lost
note affidavits per year, but the report does not give data on lost notes
or lost note affidavits for the independent document custodians or for
28
servicers.
Private-label securitization practices regarding notes were
inconsistent. The standard language in securitization contracts usually
required either A) that the note be endorsed specially by the payee to
the first transferee, by the first transferee to the second, and so on, or
B) that the note be endorsed in blank, and physically delivered to the

23 Mark A. Cymrot & Amika Biggs, Report to Fannie Mae Regarding
Shareholder Complaints by Mr. Nye Lavalle (May 19, 2006) (unpublished, internal
report),
available at http://4closurefraud.org/201 2/02/04/ocj-case-no-5595confidential-report-to-fannie-mae-regarding-shareholder-complaints-of-foreclosure
-fraud-by-mr-nye-lavalle/; see also Gretchen Morgenstern, A Mortgage Tornado
Warning, Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at BUl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/business/mortgage-tomado-warningunheeded.html?pagewanted=all.
24 Cymrot & Biggs, supra note 23, at 45-48, See also Selling Guide: Fannie
Mae
Single
Family,
FANNIE
MAE,
919
(Dec.
20,
2011),
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/sg/pdf/sell22011.pdf ("The originating
lender must be the original payee on the note, even when MERS is named as
nominee for the beneficiary in the security instrument. The note must be endorsed
to each subsequent owner of the mortgage unless one or more of the owners
endorsed the note in blank. The last endorsement on the note should be that of the
mortgage seller. The mortgage seller must endorse the note in blank and without
recourse."); U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 44-45.

25 Cymrot & Biggs, supra note 23, at 49.
Id. at 50-51.
7 Id. at 54.

SId. at 55.

2012]

Losing the Paper

475

trustee for the securitization. 29 Much anecdotal evidence suggests that
servicers of private-label securitized mortgages either delivered
original notes without endorsements to document custodians for the
trust,30 routinely prepared lost note affidavits in lieu of delivering
notes to foreclosure attorneys and trustees, routinely destroyed
original notes,3 1 and/or obtained or forged necessary endorsements
long after the transfers were supposed to have taken place. 32
There is evidence that, especially during the subprime lending
boom of 2004-2007, notes were neither endorsed nor delivered.3 3 For
example, an informal survey of Florida foreclosures found that copies
of mortgage notes originated by New Centur Mortgage and filed
with foreclosure suits were never endorsed. 4 Similarly, Fortune
Magazine surveyed foreclosure files in New York and found that in
every case out of the 103 it examined, when Countrywide was the
original note payee, the notes were not endorsed, either in blank or to
a specific payee, despite the fact that all of the foreclosures were in
the name of a securitization trust. 35 The survey was conducted in
response to the widely reported testimony of one bank employee,
who told a bankruptcy court that it was Countrywide's practice never
to deliver original mortgage notes to the trustee after securitization.36
Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in
Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Comty.
Opportunity of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 11Ith Cong. 2d Sess. (2010) [hereinafter
"Levitin testimony"] (testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law,
available
at
University
Law
Center), .
Georgetown
http://financialservices.house.gov/Mediaifile/hearings/ll1/Levitin111810.pdf.
30 See, e.g., Veal v. Am. Home Mortg., Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 903-04
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (note endorsed specially to moving creditor's predecessor,
not to moving creditor or in blank).
31 Levitin testimony, supra note 29, at 24, n. 99.
32 See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289 (Me.
2010) (finding that note was endorsed and delivered to securitization trustee three
years after mortgage origination and several months after judicial foreclosure
filing); see also Scot J. Paltrow, Legal Woes Mount for a Foreclosure Kingpin,
REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2010), http://us.mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE6B
547N20101206 (describing one firm's practice of mass producing mortgage
assignments with bogus information for foreclosure law firms.).
3 Whitman, supra note 14, at 758.
34 Scot J. Paltrow, Mortgage Mess Redux: Robo-Signers Return, REUTERS
(July 19, 2011), http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/1/07/Foreclosure.pdf.
35 Abigail Field, At Bank of America, More Incomplete Mortgage Docs Raise
More Questions, CNN (June 3, 2011), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/03/at
-bank-of-america-more-incomplete-mortgage-docs-and-more-questions.
36 See Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Kemp), 440 B.R. 624
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2010).
29
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On the other hand, Moody's reported that it surveyed the entire pool
of mortgages at issue in the same case and found missing
assignments or note endorsements in only 180 out of 9,233 cases. 37
It is difficult to reconcile these small sample surveys and
reports. Clearly, some lenders and servicers stopped bothering to
endorse and deliver notes, while others sometimes used lost note
affidavits as a short cut to avoid the expense of retrieving notes that,
in fact, had been endorsed and delivered. Servicers sometimes dealt
with missing endorsements by obtaining or preparing endorsements
on "allonges", i.e. documents separate from the note, whose
legitimacy can be called into question.3 8 Some of these problems can
be cured in individual cases, albeit often at considerable expense. For
example, missing endorsements can sometimes be obtained or a
servicer in possession of a note can establish rights of a non-holder in
possession with contract documents. Some of the cases dismissing
foreclosures or even invalidating sales seem to result from note
transfer failures that could be remedied. 39 Nevertheless, there is
substantial evidence of a significant breakdown in the system of
endorsement and delivery of mortgage notes in the pre-2007 period.
3. When a Mortgage Note is Not Properly Transferred, What are the
Consequences?
a. Judicial State Before Judgment and Sale
In most, but not all, judicial foreclosure states, a foreclosure
will be dismissed on the grounds of lack of standing if the plaintiff
cannot establish it is a person entitled to enforce a note under the
U.C.C. §3-301 or under common law. 40 A few states, notably
Pennsylvania, seem to require only a valid mortgage assignment for
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 4, at 48.
See Morgan v. HSBC Bank USA, NA, 2011 WL 3207776 (Ky. App. 2011)
(finding it "troubling" that plaintiff first asserted that the note was unavailable, then
filed a note payable to a prior lender, and then with its motion for summary
judgment produced a new allonge to the note endorsing the note to the plaintiff); In
re Kemp, 440 B.R. at 629.
3 See, e.g., Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Kroening, 2011 WL 5130357
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (granting summary judgment for foreclosure over standing
objections where MERS was plaintiff, record mortgagee and also had physical
possession of the note, endorsed in blank by the original lender, and was thus a
holder under Article 3).
40 In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Riggs v.
Aurora Loan Serv., LLC, 36 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. Dist. App. 2010); Bank of New
York v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274 (N.Y.A.D. 2011).
3

38
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the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case and do not require proof
that the plaintiff has rights in the note.4 1 The more typical position is
the reverse, i.e., that the plaintiff must show it has rights in the note,
which is the basic contract for payments, even if the mortgage has not
yet been assigned because the note transfer carries with it an
equitable right to the mortgage. 42 The rights in the note must exist
prior to filing the foreclosure action.4 3 To vest the plaintiff with the
right to enforce the note, the prior holder must have endorsed and
delivered the note, or executed some separate agreement to sell the
note, prior to the foreclosure. Thus, note transfer failures will prevent
judicial foreclosures, in the event the borrower defends the case,
unless and until the note transfer defect can be cured. Of the various
scenarios discussed, this one appears to have resulted in the largest
number of failed foreclosures.
b. Judicial State After Judgment and Sale
After a judgment is entered, the policies of finality of
judgments and title transfers come into play, especially when the
foreclosed home has been resold to a bona fide purchaser. For
example, in Mortgage Electronic Registration Services v. Barnes, the
Illinois Appellate Court rejected a post-judgment challenge to a
foreclosure by MERS, despite the apparently undisputed fact that
MERS was never the holder or owner of the note. While the court
recognized that a Sroper transfer of the note is a precondition to a
valid foreclosure, the court reasoned that the Illinois foreclosure
statute authorized an agent of the note holder to foreclose, and that
MERS could easily have amended its Complaint to allepe its status as
agent rather than as principal holder of the note.4 The default
judgment entered against the homeowner was essentially res judicata
46
as to the plaintiffs standing to foreclose. To put it another way,
standing was treated by the court as a waivable defense, the absence
of which does not render a foreclosure judgment subject to later
See In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526, 536, n.26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).
See, e.g., Harvey v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 69 So.3d 300, 304 (Fla.
Dist. App. 2011).
43 Id.; Bank of New York v. Raflogianis, 13 A.3d 435 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div.
2010) (judgment denied because BONY could not prove note had been physically
endorsed and delivered to it prior to filing suit).
4 Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Barnes, 940 N.E.2d 118 (Ill. App.
2010), appeal denied 949 N.E. 2d 659 (111. 2011).
45 Id.
41
42

46

id.
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attack as void.4 7
Likewise, in Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Pagano, the New
Jersey Appellate Court refused to set aside a default judgment despite
allegations of a defective note transfer.4 8 Defendants in that case
pointed to the fact that the plaintiff did not have possession of the
note at the time of foreclosure and did not record its mortgage
assignment until after the foreclosure filing. The court held that the
effort to set aside the default judgment was untimely, and also that
the foreclosure proceeded with the consent of the proper party,
despite the defective note transfer.49 The clear implication of the
decision is that a defective note transfer does not render a default
judgment void, and that absent some showing that the plaintiff was a
stranger to the transaction, the judgment and foreclosure will not be
disturbed.
On the other hand, some post-sale challenges have succeeded.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Deutsche Bank
National Trust v. Mitchell was in an unusual dual posture, both prejudgment and post-sale.50 The court reversed a grant of summary
judgment, but also voided a completed foreclosure sale on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not provided any evidence that it had
possession of the Note when filing the foreclosure. Applying UCC
Article 3 without discussing the threshold negotiability coverage
issue, the court found that the plaintiff was not a holder or a
transferee in possession under UCC §3-301, nor had it offered any
evidence meeting the criteria for enforcement of a lost note under 3309. The court looked past conclusory affidavits from the plaintiffs
attorney and the plaintiffs servicer asserting that plaintiff was the
holder and owner of the note and mortgage and cited the affidavits'
failure to say how and when, if ever, the plaintiff came into
possession of the original note. 5 ' Implicit in the court's reasoning was
that the affidavits did not attempt to prove acquisition of the
noteholder's rights via some other means such as by a separate sale
47 See also Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Delphonse, 883 N.Y.S. 2d 135
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
48 Aurora Loan Serv., Inc. v. Pagano, 2011 WL 6153634 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 2011).
49 Id.; but see Bank of New York v. Cupo, 2012 WL 611849 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 2012) (reversing denial of motion to vacate default judgment for further
findings on issue of standing, suggesting that lack of standing might make a
judgment void, rather than treating standing as waived by default judgment).
50 Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 27 A.3d 1229 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 2011).
5 Id. at 1237.
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and purchase contract. Strictly speaking, this case was a challenge to
standing before judgment because it was a direct appeal from the
grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff. However, the foreclosure
sale had not been stayed pending the appeal, and the result of the
decision was also to undo a completed sale. The court did not analyze
separately whether the sale had rendered the standing issue moot.
Strictly speaking, standing and real party in interest are two
distinct prerequisites to a judicial foreclosure. For example, MERS
may have standing, in the sense that it is, in fact, the agent for the
current holder of the mortgage and note; however, MERS may not be
the real party in interest if it fails to disclose its agency and the
identity of its principal. 52 Even so, as a practical matter, neither of
these legal theories is generally available after a default judgment or
summary judgment has been entered. As a result, judicial foreclosure
sales are unlikely to be set-aside on the basis that the party who
started the foreclosure had not received a valid transfer of the
mortgage and note.
There are nevertheless occasional exceptions, so that even in
judicial foreclosure states, title stability may be affected by note
transfer problems.
c. Non-judicial State Before Sale
In a non-judicial foreclosure state, the borrower must bring an
affirmative suit to enjoin the sale in order to assert defenses or defects
in the sale process.53 The California Court of Appeals has held that a
borrower cannot challenge a non-judicial sale by filing a lawsuit
essentially demanding that the trustee prove it is receiving
instructions from the current holder of the note.5 4 Thus, while the
principle remains the same - i.e. that only the present holder or owner
of the note may initiate a foreclosure - there is a critical difference
between non-judicial and judicial foreclosure states as to how the
52

See In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526, 540 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).

53 See Timothy Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis:

Why Procedural Requirements Are Necessary To Prevent Further Loss to
Homeowners, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1719 (2012) (advocating fee-shifting provisions for
borrowers challenging nonjudicial foreclosures).
54 Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (Ct. App.
2011); see Chilton v. Federal Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, No. 1:09-CV-02187 (E.D. Cal.
2009) (finding there is no requirement under California law that the foreclosing
trustee possess the original note, but recognizing that the trustee must have
permission to act on behalf of the proper beneficiary of the trust deed, i.e. the
current note holder or owner).
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issue will be raised. In a judicial foreclosure, as the plaintiff, the
foreclosing party must come forward with evidence that it is the
proper transferee of the note, and the defendant homeowner can
essentially put the plaintiff to its proof. In a non-judicial foreclosure
state, the objecting homeowner must come forward with a plausible
claim that the party giving notice of a foreclosure sale is not the
proper transferee.
While non-judicial sales are difficult to challenge because the
borrower must come forward with evidence of a note transfer
problem, new grounds for such challenges are emerging in nonjudicial foreclosure states that have recently adopted foreclosure
mediation statutes. Nevada, for example, adopted a pre-foreclosure
mediation statute in 2009 that requires a notice to the homeowner
and, if the homeowner chooses, a mandatory mediation session at
which the deed of trust beneficiary must be present, negotiate in good
faith, and must present documents including the deed of trust, the
note and all assignments.55 If a homeowner requests mediation and
the foreclosing party fails to comply, the foreclosure sale may not
proceed. 56 The District of Columbia, which permits non-judicial
foreclosures, has adopted a similar mediation statute, which explicitly
provides that a sale conducted in violation of the mediation rules is
void, causing great concern among title insurers. 57
d. Note: Non-judicial State after Sale
Because the title transfer by a trustee under a deed of trust
usually has no judicial imprimatur,sg the resulting title may later be

5 NEV.

REV. STAT. § 107.086(4) (2012).
Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281 (Nev. 2011); Leyva v. Nat'l
Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275 (Nev. 2011) (non-judicial foreclosures
could not proceed under Nevada foreclosure mediation statue where party seeking
foreclosure was neither the holder of the note nor assignee beneficiary of the deed
of trust).
s7 D.C. CODE § 42-815.02(h) (2012); Cezary Podkul, District Effort to Help
DistressedHomeowners could Halt Foreclosure Sales, WASH. POST, Jul. 7, 2011,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/district-effort-tohelp-distressed-homeowners-could-halt-foreclosure-sales/2011/07/07/gIQABcbn2
H_story.html; see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.031 (West 2012)
(Washington foreclosure mediation statute).
58 A few states with non-judicial power of sale foreclosures provide for judicial
confirmation of the foreclosure title. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-161(a)
(requiring confirmation of Georgia non-judicial sales as a precondition to seeking a
deficiency judgment); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 765 (2011).
56
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challenged based on the trustee's lack of authority to sell. 59 The
common law rule allows post-sale challenges when there is
unfairness or irregularity in the sale process, presumably including an
absence of authority to sell, combined with harm to the former
owner, usually meaning a grossly inadequate sales price.co On the
other hand, some non-judicial foreclosure states have severely limited
the ability of homeowners to challenge defective foreclosure sales
after the fact.61 Various impediments to post-sale challenges by
former owners mean that, as a practical matter, defective note
transfers will not result in title defects in a large number of cases.
One key obstacle has been the requirement in many states that a
homeowner must show an ability to tender the mortgage debt as a
precondition to any post-sale challenge. 62
Courts in many non-judicial states have also been unreceptive
to post-sale challenges based on note transfer issues on the merits.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Residential Funding Co., L.L.C., v.
Saurman recently rejected a challenge to a completed non-judicial
sale by the former owner, where the challenge was based on the
undisputed fact that MERS initiated the sale, but was never the holder
or owner of the note.63 The court relied on language of the Michigan
statute authorizing foreclosure by advertisement and sale:
The party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of
the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness
secured by the mortgage or the servicing agent of the
mortgage.
According to the Michigan Supreme Court, MERS owned an
"interest in the indebtedness", not by having any interest in the note
but via its bare legal title to the mortgage securing the note.
59 Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales:
Extending the Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraudor Unfairness, 23
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139, 154-55 (2006).
60 Id.

Id. at 152-53.
See, e.g., Forbes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. E051309, 2011 WL
4985965 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("a valid and viable tender of payment of the
indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed
of trust"); Saldate v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1141 (E.D. Cal.
2010); Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen, 205 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Ct. App. 1984).
63 Residential Funding Co., L.L.C., v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich.
2011), rev'g 807 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
6 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3204(l)(d) (2012).
65 Saurman, 805 N.W.2d
at 342.
61

62
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Interestingly, the court did not comment on the appellate court's
related holding that if MERS did not have the required interest in the
debt, the non-judicial sale would have been void ab initio and thus
subject to post-sale legal challenge. 66 In an earlier case, the Michigan
Appeals Court voided a sale based on a missing mortgage transfer. 67
However, the validity of that decision was called into question by the
Appeals Court decision in Saurman because of a change in the
foreclosure statute that deleted the requirement for the foreclosing
68
party to record a mortgage assignment prior to a notice of sale.
California courts have not been hospitable to post-sale
challenges based on note transfer defects either. In Calvo v. H.S.B.C.
Bank, USA, N.A., the Court of Appeals held that the trustee under a
deed of trust need not record an assignment of the trust deed, and
implicitly held that ownership of the note was unnecessary to conduct
a foreclosure sale, so long as the original trustee or a properly
substituted trustee conducted the sale. 69 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, on the other hand, has implied that a defective note
transfer could void a trustee's deed, although the case was decided
based on gaps in the mortgage transfer.7 0
Courts in non-judicial foreclosure states with mediation
statutes, like Nevada and the District of Columbia, have not yet
addressed the question of whether a trustee's failure to demonstrate a
valid note transfer could give rise to a post-sale challenge based on
the mediation statutes. That has been the concern expressed by title
insurers about the "void" language in the District of Columbia
statute, but the outcome of a post-sale challenge based on note
transfer gaps and mediation statutes is difficult to predict.71
It is not always easy to reconcile the reasoning of these
various cases. Often, the precise legal issue, for example, of whether
a mortgage assignee in possession of a note payable to someone else
with no endorsements can foreclose comes out differently, perhaps as
Id. (dismissing eviction case bought by sale purchaser after non-judicial sale
on the grounds that the party conducting the sale did not have any interest in the
note, i.e. the "indebtedness," as required by the Michigan statute).
67 Davenport v. HSBC Bank, 739 N.W.2d 383 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2007), appeal
denied, 743 N.W.2d 945 (Mich. 2008).
68 ResidentialFunding Co., 807 N.W.2d
at 420-2 1.
69 Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, NA, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 819
(Ct. App. 2011).
7o See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011)(holding
that nonjudicial sale was void based on absence of mortgage assignment, and
noting that note transferee has an equitable claim to compel assignment of the
mortgage).
71 See note 57, supra.
66
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much reflecting the courts' perception of the desirability of speedy
and efficient foreclosures on the one hand or of their unhappiness
with the industry's shortcuts and shortcomings on the other. Courts in
non-judicial states seem reluctant, although not entirely unwilling, to
hold up foreclosures based on defective note transfers.
To summarize, there is evidence that a significant number of
notes were either not endorsed or not delivered to secondary market
purchasers, although less so in the GSE sector than the private
securitization sector. Although note ownership can be proven without
endorsement and delivery, there are few if any reported court
decisions describing and approving alternative proof methods, such
as using a pooling and servicing agreement with a loan schedule.
Missing notes or endorsements clearly can delay or prevent
foreclosures in judicial states where the borrower defends the lawsuit.
The delays in New York during 2010 and 2011 in particular have
clearly been attributable in part to note transfer failures. 72
Post-sale challenges to non-judicial sales based on note
transfer problems have been less frequent and less successful, in part
because the burden is on the homeowner to bring suit rather than on
the mortgage assignee to establish its standing to sue. Once a
foreclosure sale is completed, note transfer defects have still been
raised and may result in the undoing of sales, but statutes and
common law favoring finality may tend to limit the number of
successful sale challenges. The Massachusetts cases stand out, and a
few other states' courts have followed suit, raising potentially serious
questions about foreclosure title stability. While most homeowners
who wish to contest foreclosures are more likely to do so prior to a
foreclosure sale than afterwards, it is conceivable that entrepreneurial
attorneys might begin to bring post-sale challenges more frequently
as case law develops. At this stage, it is simply too soon to predict the
extent of title litigation and foreclosure delays that will result from
note transfer failures.
B. Transfer (Assignment) of Mortgage
1. What Legal Methods are Available to Transfer a Mortgage?
Mortgages are transfers of interests in land and, therefore,
must be in writing.7 3 Likewise, an assignment of mortgage must
David Streitfeld, Backlog of Cases Gives a Reprieve on Foreclosures,N.Y.
at
available
Al,
at
2011,
19,
June
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/business/19foreclosure.html?pagewanted=all.
7 Renuart, supra note 12,
at 16.
72
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typically be in writing, generally separate from the mortgage itself,
and must be recorded in county land records, at least in order to
protect the assignee from competing claims to the mortgage.7 4 A
mortgage assignment document is a conveyance of an interest in
land, and therefore must have a grantor and grantee.7 5 An assignment
that is signed by the mortgagee but does not identify any party to
whom the mortgage is being assigned, i.e. an assignment in blank,
does not effectively assign the mortgagee's interest and cannot be the
basis for a foreclosure by a party who later fills in the missing
assignee and attempts to present or record the assignment. 76 The
transfer of a mortgage is, therefore, usually executed in a different
manner than a note transfer.7 7
2. What Methods Were Actually Used to Assign Mortgages
Empirically?
As with notes, the document practices for assigning
mortgages varied by market sector. Fannie Mae's practice was to
have the bank or mortgage company servicing the loan remain the
record mortgagee or mortgage assignee or use MERS as the
mortgagee of record. The servicer would then transfer the property
after foreclosure sale or assign its successful bid to Fannie Mae.
When a mortgage loan is first sold to Fannie Mae, the loan seller is
instructed either 1) to record the mortgage or an assignment in the
name of MERS or 2) to prepare and deliver, but not to record, an
assignment from the seller to Fannie Mae. 79 Foreclosures are
generally to be filed in the name of the servicer, with a few
exceptions. Thus, Fannie Mae avoids appearing as the mortgagee of
record in most states. Freddie Mac's procedures are generally similar

See Christopher Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 1359 (2010);
Renuart, supra note 12, at 16.
7 Peterson, supra note 8, at 135-37.
76 U.S. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 50-51 (Mass. 2011);
Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1285 n.9 (Nev. 2011).
7 But see In re Williams, 395 B.R. 33 (S.D. Oh. 2008) (noting that Ohio
statute permits a mortgage assignment to be noted on the margin of the mortgage
document).
7 Fannie Mae Servicing Guide § 105, at 801-29-801-3 1, § 201 (June 2011)
[hereinafter
"Fannie
Mae
Servicing
Guide"],
available
at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/svcg/svcO61011.pdf.
7 Fannie Mae Seller's Guide § B-8-602, at 936 (2011), available at
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/sg/pdf/selO 12711 .pdf.
74
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to Fannie Mae's.8 0
In our own survey of foreclosure and land records in six states
we found numerous foreclosures filed in the name of a bank, when
Fannie Mae held the mortgage, according to MERS. 8 ' Given the
other inaccuracies with MERS, it is difficult to know in a particular
case whether the servicer has made an error in reporting ownership
information to MERS or the case involves a legitimate Fannie-held
mortgage being foreclosed by the servicer as agent for Fannie Mae,
its undisclosed principal.
In the private-label securitization market, two methods seem
to predominate, although neither accuracy nor consistency seems to
have been achieved with either method. One method was for the
originator to prepare a blank mortgage assignment to be filled in later
in the event that recording the assignment became necessary for
foreclosure purposes. 82 Another method was to record the original
mortgage, or an assignment, with MERS as the "nominee" or proxy
mortgagee and then purportedly have MERS maintain accurate
records of the true beneficial owner of the mortgage and any changes
in ownership. 83 A third probably unplanned method was to take
neither step, so that when foreclosure becomes necessary, the servicer
is forced to obtain an assignment (or perhaps fabricate one) from the
original lender to the current owner.84
See Freddie Mac Single Family Seller/Servicer Guide, Chapter 16:
Documentation Delivery, availableat http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/.
81 Data compiled by author from foreclosure and property
records in Indiana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Texas, and Iowa. For details on the
MERS/foreclosure comparison data, see Appendix 2.
80

82

AMERICAN

SECURITIZATION

FORUM WHITE PAPER, TRANSFER AND
ASSIGNMENT OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE
at
available
(2010),
4
MARKET

http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASFWhitePaper 11 16 1
0.pdf; SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, Q&A
REGARDING MORTGAGE LOAN TRANSFERS AND SECURITIZATION (October 20,
2010), available at http://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/issues/capital

markets/secu

ritization/securitization/sifma%20mortgage%20transfer%20and%20securitization%
20question%20and%20answers.pdf.
83 Peterson, supra note
8, at 116-17
See

AEQUITAS

COMPLIANCE

SOLUTIONS, INC., FORECLOSURE IN
CALIFORNIA: A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 7 (2012) [hereinafter "AEQUITAS"],
84

availableat http://aequitasaudit.com/images/aequitas sf report.pdf (finding that in
27% of sampled foreclosure cases, the mortgage assignment was signed by the
servicer or trustee rather than the original lender, 11% of assignments were signed
for the assignor by the assignee, and identifying other evidence of doubtful
mortgage assignments).
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3. The Failure of MERS to Accurately Record Mortgage Ownership
MERS was created in order to eliminate the need to record
each mortgage assignment in county property records. Participating
member mortgage lenders and servicers agree to record mortgages in
county property records showing MERS as the proxy mortgagee. 86
MERS purports to be a national database of mortgage ownership and
ownership changes. 87 However, prior to 2011 MERS was not
regulated by any state or federal agency, and its database was not
regularly audited.8 8 Because MERS relied on its mortgage industry
members - banks and servicing companies - to voluntarily report

loan ownership transfers the MERS database Was not a reliable
record of those transfers."'
Our own survey of 396 foreclosure cases in six judicial
foreclosure states found that where MERS was mortgagee of record
(fifty percent of cases), the plaintiff asserting the right to foreclose
matched an identified "investor" in the MERS public record only
twenty percent of the time. 90 Not all mismatches mean that the MERS
record is incorrect. For Fannie Mae loans, there will typically be a
mismatch because MERS may accurately list Fannie Mae as the
investor, while the foreclosure, per the Fannie Mae Servicing Guide,
is filed in the name of the servicer as agent. 91 Likewise, the
significant number of cases in which the MERS investor is not
disclosed could mean either that MERS does not have a record of the
current loan owner, or that it does have accurate information but
refuses to disclose it.9 2
Based on the survey, there seems to be a general practice
among foreclosure attorneys to record a mortgage assignment from
MERS to the party bringing the foreclosure action, shortly before or
as See Hearing on MERS Before the H. Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty.
Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., (Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
"Statement of R.K. Arnold"] (statement of R.K. Arnold, Pres. and C.E.O. of
MERSCORP, Inc.); Peterson, supra note 8.
86 Peterson, supra note 74, at 1370-71.
87 Statement of R.K. Arnold, supranote 85.
88 INTERAGENCY REvIEw, supra note 4, at 10.
89 One court referred to MERS as the "Wikipedia" of land records. Culhane v.
Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., No. 11-11098-WGY, 2011 WL 5925525 (D. Mass.
Nov. 28, 2011).
90 Data compiled by author from foreclosure and property records in Indiana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Texas, and Iowa. For details on the
MERS/foreclosure comparison data, see Appendix 2.
9 See Fannie May Servicing Guide, supra note 78.
92 Peterson, supra note 8, at 130.
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after filing the foreclosure, so that the record mortgagee matched the
foreclosure plaintiff about ninety percent of the time. Thus, MERS
and the mortgage servicer identified different entities as the mortgage
owner in the majority of cases. For reasons explained in the
Appendix, our sample is one of convenience rather than a
representative sample of all judicial foreclosure states. However, our
results are consistent with those from other investigators: MERS is
not a "nationwide database that tracks changes in . . . ownership

interest in mortgage loans".93
Similarly low MERS accuracy rates were reported by an audit
Francisco Office of the Assessor-Recorder. California is a
the
San
for
nonjudicial foreclosure state, so the audit compared the identity of the
deed of trust beneficiary in the sale deed to the investor identified on
MERS. The audit found only a 42% match excluding cases where
MERS did not disclose the investor. 94
An example of a MERS mortgage transfer history from the
Maine case, MERS v. Saunders,95 appears in Appendix 1. In this case,
the MERS transfer history reflected that there was a foreclosure filing
in January 2009, purportedly by the originating lender, although the
opinion explains that Select Portfolio Servicing ("SPS") brought the
foreclosure, as servicing agent for Deutsche Bank, trustee. The
history next reflected the removal of an apparent security interest in
favor of warehouse lender Goldman Sachs. The MERS history did
not contain any note of Goldman's initial interest. Next, MERS
shows that the beneficial ownership was transferred from the
originator to the servicer, SPS. Last, SPS transferred the ownership
interest to Deutsche Bank, several months after the foreclosure.
Clearly, this particular MERS transfer history is inaccurate. Indeed,
the history contained an unnecessary detour through the servicer and
an incomplete creation and release of the warehouse lender's security
interest. The true mortgage transfer from the originator to Deutsche
Bank was noted years after that change in beneficial ownership
supposedly took place, and only after the issue was raised in a
disputed foreclosure case.
The MERS transfer method has raised a host of unresolved
9 Statement of R.K. Arnold, supra note 85. For other findings of MERS'
inaccuracy, see Interagency Review, supra note 4; De. vs. MERSCorp, Inc., No.
2011-10-27, Compl. 8 (De. Ch. 2011). Even in cases where MERS was not used,
foreclosure plaintiffs did not uniformly match the mortgage assignee in county
property records. However, in those cases the mismatch rate was only 10%.

94 AEQUITAS, supra note 84, at 13.
9

2010).

-See Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 292 (Me.
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legal issues. The first wave of cases concerned the question of
whether MERS has standing (or is the real party in interest) so that it
can bring a judicial foreclosure suit in its own name.96 In states where
MERS is found not to be the proper plaintiff, a relatively easy fix
requires MERS to assign the mortgage back to the true assignee and
note holder, who can sue in its own name.
However, this maneuver raises the question of whether a
mortgage assignment from MERS to the current holder is valid. 97
These assignments are typically executed by employees of either the
current servicer or the attorney filing the foreclosure, essentially
purporting to act as agent for the assignor and assigning it to his or
her principal (or client). The MERS system of allowing all its
members' employees to appoint themselves assistant vice presidents
raises important agency law questions regarding the validity of these
assignments.98 This becomes a particular concern when combined
with the inaccuracy of the MERS database. If any mortgage servicer
or foreclosure attorney belonging to MERS can assign a MERS
mortgage to his company or his client relying on incorrect
information in the database, the possibilities of error and of
competing claims to the right to foreclose arise. More fundamentally,
the ability of any MERS member to alter the mortgage ownership
information in MERS more or less at will, may lead courts to become
increasingly reluctant to recognize MERS assignments as a valid
basis for a foreclosure sale.

Compare Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 419 (2011) (finding MERS may
initiate nonjudicial foreclosure), with Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize,
965 So. 2d 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that MERS may initiate judicial
foreclosure), and Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Barnes, 940 N.E.2d 118
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see Saunders, 2 A.3d at 298 (MERS is not proper plaintiff in
judicial foreclosure, but may assign mortgage to real party in interest); Bank of
N.Y. v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). The author is not aware
of any cases holding that MERS may not initiate a foreclosure sale in a nonjudicial
foreclosure deed of trust state.
9 See In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that MERS
could not legally assign a mortgage because it was never a proper mortgagee).
98 See Peterson, supra note 8; but see Forbes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., No. E051309, 2011 WL 4985965 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (rejecting claim that
execution of assignment of deed of trust and on behalf of MERS and the trustee's
deed on behalf of the beneficiary by the same individual was invalid).
96
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4. When Transfer Was Improper What Are the Consequences?
a. Mortgage: Judicial State Before Judgment and Sale
Courts in judicial foreclosure states differ when deciding how
a failed mortgage transfer affects a plaintiff's legal right to foreclose.
Three related questions do not seem to have a common answer: (1)
whether the plaintiff in a foreclosure must hold a valid mortgage
assignment, (2) whether the assignment must be recorded, and (3)
whether the recording must occur before filing foreclosure.
The Connecticut Court of Appeals has held that the proper
holder of the note is entitled to foreclose, even without any
assignment of the mortgage. 99 The holding was based on a specific
state statute that seemed to provide explicitly for that result.' As a
result the court found that any problems with MERS as a mortgagee
could not serve as the basis to challenge a foreclosure by the note
holder, invoking the more general principal that "the mortgage
follows the note." 101
New York and Ohio courts, on the other hand, have
consistently held that the foreclosing plaintiff must be the assignee of
the mortgage prior to filing judicial foreclosure. 102 Certainly the
preferred practice in most judicial foreclosure states is to record a
valid assignment from the prior record mortgagee or assignee to the
foreclosing entity prior to filing a foreclosure complaint, or at least
prior to a judicial sale, to insure a complete record chain of title.
b. Mortgage: Judicial State after Judgment and Sale
In a post-judgment case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
voided a judicial foreclosure sale and set aside a default judgment,
when the Complaint on its face alleged a mortgage to a different
lender and did not even allege any transfer or assignment of the note
or mortgage to the plaintiff in the case.103 The case was unusual
because the plaintiff's attorney failed to even allege a chain of
mortgage assignments ending with the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the
99 Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, 989 A.2d 606 (Con. App. Ct. 2010).
100 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 49-17.
101Fequiere, 989 A.2d at 611.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 69 A.D.3d 204, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615
(App. Div., 2009); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 897 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008); accord Morgan v. HSBC Bank, USA, NA, No. 2009-CA-000597-MR,
2011 WL 3207776 (Ky. Ct. App. July 29, 2011).
103 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lupori, 8 A.3d 919 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
102
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implications of the case are significant: if the complaint itself,
presumably including attached mortgages and assignments,
demonstrates that the plaintiff was not the mortgage assignee when
the foreclosure was filed, the foreclosure sale will be subject to later
attack. The case appears to be nearly unique, perhaps because most
homeowners have focused their attacks on defective note transfers
rather than defective mortgage assignments.
c. Mortgage: Nonjudicial State before Sale
The California Court of Appeals held in Gomes v.
Countrywide that a borrower could not assert a legal challenge to a
trustee's sale prior to the sale based on asserted defects in the chain
of ownership of the loan, namely the invalidity of a MERS mortgage
assignment. 04 Other courts in nonjudicial states have followed a
similar approach, reasoning that a trustee's sale is presumed to be
bona fide, and it.is not the obligation of the trustee to prove to anyone
that it is authorized to foreclose by the proper beneficial owner of the
mortgage.105 Thus, we see a critical difference between judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosure - the borrower cannot simply put the
foreclosing party to its proof in a nonjudicial state. As a result, the
ability of borrowers generally to assert mortgage transfer issues is
considerably diminished in nonjudicial states, simply because of the
burden of going forward.
On the other hand, some state statutes prescribing the process
for nonjudicial foreclosure require recording of assignments of the
beneficial interest in the deed of trust prior to sale, and hence will
enjoin or invalidate a sale conducted without a valid, recorded
assignment. 0 6
d. Mortgage: Nonjudicial State after Sale
Thus far, courts in nonjudicial foreclosure states have not
been hospitable to homeowners bringing post-sale challenges based
Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819 (Cal. Ct.
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 419 (2011).
2011),
App.
1os See, e.g., Trotter v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 38022, 2012 WL 206004
(Idaho Jan. 25, 2012).
106 Burgett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 09-644-HO,
2010 WL
4282105 (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2010); see also In re Adams, 693 S.E.2d 705 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2011) (denying judicial approval of a power of sale foreclosure in hybrid
judicial/nonjudicial foreclosure where note was not endorsed to the selling party
and no other evidence of note ownership was offered).
'a
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on allegedly invalid mortgage assignments. A number of legal
impediments to such challenges may as a practical matter limiit any
impact on stability of titles that robosigning and MERS may have
had. First, in many states, a homeowner challenging a nonjudicial
sale must plead that she was not in default in payments, or can tender
payment in full of the mortgage debt.10 7 Second, once a trustee's deed
is conveyed to a bona fide purchaser, statutes or common law may
preclude further challenges to the validity of the foreclosure sale
based on note or mortgage transfer defects.
Thus a victim of an
improper foreclosure may have a claim for damages, assuming they
can establish causation, but finality policies will prevent title from
being disturbed by post-sale challenges.
On the other hand, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
in a pair of 2011 decisions, U.S. Bank v. Ibanez 09 and Bevilacqua v.
Rodriguez,110 became the first state high court thus far to raise serious
doubts about the validity of nonjudicial foreclosure sale titles tainted
by gaps in mortgage assignments. Professor Elizabeth Renuart's
recent article provides a thorough discussion of the Massachusetts
cases, and their possible extension to other nonjudicial foreclosure
states including California, Nevada, Arizona and Georgia.'1I
Although she concludes that these four states could follow
Massachusetts' lead, none of them has thus far. Interestingly, one
appellate court in Alabama has followed Massachusetts, and ruled
that a homeowner could defend against a post-sale ejectment action
on the basis that the party noticing a nonjudicial foreclosure sale was
not the mortgage assignee prior to the sale.112
The Ibanez case arose under somewhat peculiar
circumstances. The foreclosing party, U.S. Bank, was in possession
of a Note endorsed in blank, and thus had properly completed the
Note transfer. However, it did not obtain a written assignment of the
mortgage in any form until after the foreclosure sale. The title
insurance company refused to insure title, and U.S. Bank then
brought an action to quiet title to get judicial approval of its sale.
Thus, the Ibanez holding is that 1) a separate written mortgage
assignment (not including an assignment with a blank assignee) must
107 In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (MERS) Litig., MDL No. 09-2119JAT, 2011 WL 4550189 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3,2011).
108 See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank NA v. Pace, 163 Wash. App.
1017 (2011).
09 U.S. Bank Nat'1 Ass'n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).
110 Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884 (Mass. 2011).
1l1 See Renuart, supra note 12.
112 Sturdivant v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, No.
2100245, 2011 WL
6275697 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 16, 2011).
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be executed, but not necessarily recorded, before the assignee can
foreclose, and 2) proper transfer of the Note is also necessary but not
sufficient condition, i.e. the holder of the Note cannot conduct a
nonjudicial sale without the written mortgage assignment. The court
noted that the mortgage assignment could be proven with a bulk loan
sale contract as well as an individual written assignment, but U.S.
Bank was unable to produce the written documents showing it had
purchased the particular loan at issue." 3
Ibanez is stricter than most cases in nonjudicial states that
require only evidence that the deed of trust was transferred, and do
not require proof of note transfer, or that simply treat a trustee's deed
as conclusive proof that the trustee had authority from the proper
party to sell. One Michigan decision also voided a nonjudicial sale
when the mortgage was not assigned until after the notice of the
foreclosure sale was published,"' but that case may no longer be
good law after the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in
Saurman."5
The impact of defective mortgage transfers on title will
depend on definitive judicial resolution of several important issues.
Nevertheless, one can see certain trends emerging. First, chain-oftitle issues are unlikely to lead to large numbers -of post-sale
challenges. The Ibanez case notwithstanding, most courts have been
unwilling to permit former homeowners to challenge a foreclosure
sale after the fact based on mortgage transfer problems, whether the
homeowners seek equitable relief undoing the sale or money
damages. Massachusetts, Michigan, Alabama and Pennsylvania have
thus far been the only states with judicial decisions invalidating a
foreclosure sale based on transfer defects. The Massachusetts case
arose not in the context of a borrower challenge but in a quiet title
action brought by the lender and the subsequent purchaser to confirm
the foreclosure deed. While there is certainly a theoretical problem
with power of sale deeds where the grantor does not have a clear
chain of title from the original trust deed beneficiary, the practical
consequences of these gaps are limited if parties with an incentive to
litigate cannot do so. Clearly, if the gap in mortgage loan transfers
resulted from a double sale of the mortgage, or a fraudulent transfer
to a thief, then the rightful owner of the mortgage could and would
challenge the invalid sale, but these instances are likely to be rare.
"1Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53.

Davenport v. HSBC Bank, 739 N.W.2d 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (finding
foreclosure sale void where foreclosing party received mortgage assignment four
days after publishing the notice of the sale, and prior to the sale).
us See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
114
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Thus, the most likely ongoing impact, and the impact
observed to date, has been and will be that homeowners intervening
before a foreclosure judgment and sale, especially in judicial states,
can prevent or delay foreclosure for extended periods of time, and in
significant numbers. In New York State, for example, default
judgments in foreclosures have declined from ninety-five percent to
fewer than ten percent.1 1 6 New York, along with other states, has also
imposed affirmative obligations on foreclosure attorneys to verify the
foreclosing party's standing, and those obligations have also slowed
down filings." When the validity of a mortgage transfer is raised
prior to judgment, there is obviously no cloud on title that lingers
after the foreclosure. Either the right party is foreclosing, or the
foreclosure sale will be prevented until the mortgage and note
transfers are properly completed. At the same time, post-sale
challenges are possible, in both judicial and non-judicial foreclosure
states, although borrowers face serious hurdles in bringing them. Just
how much traction Ibanez and its progeny will have and what it will
prove to be its legacy on foreclosure titles depends as much on the
wherewithal of lawyers and litigants as on the resolution of knotty
legal issues.
The political and economic context also matters. The tidal
wave of foreclosure litigation around note and mortgage transfers is
taking place because millions of delinquent homeowners are seeking
workouts and contract modifications from recalcitrant mortgage
servicers."1 The national settlement among federal and state
regulators and five major banks resolves regulator claims arising in
part from robo-signing and transfer failures, but its remedies call for
extensive new efforts to work out troubled mortgage loans. The
failures of mortgage servicing are thus directly related to the clouding
of foreclosure titles, in the sense that far fewer borrowers would
assert transfer failures in litigation if comprehensive renegotiation of
defaulted loans could resolve the present foreclosure crisis.
116

STATE OF NEW YORK UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,

2011

REPORT OF THE CHIEF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 507 OF THE LAWS OF

at
available
4,
at
2009,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/pdfs/ForeclosuresReportNov20 11.pdf.
" Id.at 1-2.
11 Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from
the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP),
52 ARIZ. L. REv. 727 (2010); Opening Address by FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair,
Summit on Residential Mortgage Servicing for the 21st Century, Sponsored by the
Mortgage Bankers Association; Washington, D.C. (January 19, 2011), availableat
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjanl911 .html.
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II. WHY IT MATTERS: CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES IN
MORTGAGE TRANSFERS
While the current wave of litigation of foreclosure standing
and note transfer issues will take years to be resolved, it remains
important to consider how a better system for tracking mortgage loan
ownership might take shape. In moving away from the old paper
endorsement and delivery of note plus recorded mortgage assignment
system, there are important consumer protection interests at stake.
The key consumer protection interests implicated by mortgage
transfers are 1) avoiding double payment or double liability, 2)
getting a prompt and secure release or satisfaction upon payment in
full and 3) having a counter-party with authority to negotiate
workouts in the event of payment difficulties.
A. Double Liability
The endorsement and delivery of a tangible paper note, the
reification of a payment obligation, serves to protect borrowers from
paying an obligation twice, or paying the wrong creditor. Obviously
only one original paper note can be presented for payment by one
party.1 9 An instance where such a threat becomes real is warehouselending fraud, in which a crooked mortgage company sells the same
note to multiple parties.' 20
Another example of how competing claims to a mortgage can
arise is illustrated in Diversified Mortgage, Inc. vs. Merscorp, Inc.121
A dispute apparently arose among partners or investors in a group of
mortgage loans for which MERS was the record mortgagee. The
plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent MERS
from permitting any of MERS "assistant vice presidents" to transfer
the mortgages to other entities while the ownership of the loans was
litigated.
In any such case, the borrower wants to be sure that the
servicer delivers all payments they make to the proper party. After
full payment, borrowers should not face demands for more money, or

"'See U.C.C. § 3-501(b)(2) (requiring the party seeking payment on a
negotiable instrument to exhibit the instrument and surrender it if payment in full is
made).
120 See Provident Bank v. Cmty. Home Mortg. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 558
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Whitman, supra note 14, at 768 n. 174.
12 Diversified Mortg., Inc. v. MERSCorp, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-2497-T-33EAJ,
2010 WL 1793632 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2010).
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worse yet, foreclosure actions on the paid-off debt. 122 Any electronic
system for tracking ownership rights in mortgage loans must be
sufficiently reliable and authoritative so that consumer borrowers are
protected from double liability.
B. Availability and Validity of Mortgage Satisfactions
Borrowers who complete their mortgage loan payments not
only wish to avoid further liability, but also are entitled to have the
mortgage lien removed from the property records to clear their title
and permit future sales, or mortgages. This is usually accomplished
by the filing of a separate mortgage release or satisfaction document.
One of the asserted benefits of MERS was that it solved the problem
that arose when homeowners finished paying a loan but could not get
a satisfaction or release document from a defunct lender. Borrowers
in some cases may have trouble locating the holder of an old
mortgage in order to obtain a release or satisfaction that can be
recorded after full payment in order to clear title. This problem could
be resolved by adoption of the 2004 Uniform Residential Satisfaction
Act, which provides a self-help title clearing mechanism, but that act
has been adopted in only two states thus far.
While an accurate and authoritative database of mortgage
ownership would in theory solve the problem, the extensive
inaccuracy of MERS seems to only compound the difficulty. The
New York Attorney General's 2011 suit against MERS alleges that
MERS has repeatedly filed erroneous mortgage satisfactions on the
wrong property. After discovering its error, MERS (i.e. the servicer)
will then file a lis pendens against the property, causing the
homeowner needless title problems and legal expenses.' 24 In early
2012 the Guilford County North Carolina recorder of deeds published
extensive documentation on its web site showing mortgage
satisfactions filed on behalf of MERS by various banks and
securitization trustees, signed by known robo-signers, i.e. by
Michelle Conlin, Foreclosure from Old Mortgages 'Most Egregious
Manifestation' of Broken Housing Market, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 26, 2012,
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/26/foreclosure-crisis-oldmortgages-most-egregious-manifestation n 1233256.html.
123R. Wilson Freyermuth, Why Mortgagors Can't Get No Satisfaction, 72 Mo.
L. REv. 1159 (2007); Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act (2004),
availableat http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/umsa/2004finalact.pdf.
124 Complaint by NY Attorney General Schneiderman in New York v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, No. 2768/2012 T 97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty 2012)
[hereinafter N.Y. Attorney General Complaint].
122
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individuals whose names appear more or less simultaneously as the
''assistant vice president" or other officer of multiple financial
institutions, and hence whose authority to satisfy the mortgages is
questionable.125 Presumably, these satisfactions were produced at the
behest of the servicer acting in the belief that they were authorized by
the appropriate assignee. Nevertheless, if another lender, perhaps a
debt buyer, sought to enforce the satisfied mortgage, there could be
expensive title litigation about the validity of the satisfactions.126
C. Negotiating Workouts
One of the many complaints from homeowners and -their
advocates about mortgage servicers during the 2007-2012 foreclosure
crisis has been the difficulty in negotiating loan modifications and
other alternatives to foreclosure. While servicing problems and
reforms are beyond the scope of this article, the issue of servicer
authority to negotiate workouts is connected to mortgage transfers. In
some instances, servicers will refuse to renegotiate mortgage
payments, or other workouts such as short sales, invoking a refusal
by, or lack of authority from, the "investor". MERS has made it more
difficult for homeowners to identify their mortgage holder. Having
this information could permit homeowners to challenge servicer
refusal to negotiate, by, among other things, inspecting publicly
disclosed servicing contracts governing securitization trusts.
Fannie Mae's and MERS' response is that most securitization
contracts give the servicer full authority, within some bounds, to
renegotiate mortgages, so that the identity of the investor should be
irrelevant to the homeowner. Nevertheless, there is a genuine
consumer borrower interest in transparency of mortgage assignments
so that the identity of the real counterparty is known. These basic
consumer protection goals should inform the design of any
modernized legal infrastructure for recording mortgage loan transfers.
See Guilford County, North Carolina, Register of Deeds, Mortgage Fraud
Information
From
Press
Conference,
available
at
http://www.co.guilford.nc.us/departments/rod/fraud.html.
126 See Conlin, supra note 122 (debt buyers seeking to enforce mortgages
previously believed to have been paid in full.); see also U.S. Government
Accountability Office, Credit Cards: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Could
Better Reflect the Evolving Debt Collection Marketplaceand Use of Technology, at
29 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-748); Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Collecting Consumer Debts: The Challenges of Change, at 22-23
(Feb.
2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf.
127 See N.Y. Attorney General Complaint,
supra note 124,
107-08.
125
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III. DESIGNING A RELIABLE ELECTRONIC MORTGAGE AND
NOTE TRANSFER SYSTEM WITH FULL CONSUMER
PROTECTION

A. Require Full DisclosureofAgency Relationships and Transfer
History
The difficulty in identifying the real party able to negotiate
loan workouts and resolve possible errors would be considerably
reduced if all principal-agent relationships were required to be
disclosed during foreclosure. Two of the biggest sources of confusion
about whether and to what extent there are breaks in the chain of title
are 1) the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac policy of filing foreclosures
in the name of the servicer while representing that the servicing agent
is in fact the principal obligee and 2) the use of MERS as a proxy
agent for multiple parties including the assignor, the assignee and the
current servicer.
Thus, a foreclosure filed in a judicial foreclosure state, and a
notice of sale in a non-judicial sale, should mandatorily identify the
original lender, current assignee, current servicer, and any agents or
proxies acting on behalf of any of them.128 For example, a foreclosure
complaint might recite that it was filed by MERS, as agent for the
servicer, Bank of America, which in turn is the servicing agent for
Wells Fargo Bank, trustee for an identified trust, which acquired the
loan on a specified date from New Century Mortgage, the original
lender.
To deal with contract renegotiations, possible double payment
issues and prompt satisfaction issues, a better system design would
incorporate transparent and authoritative registration of mortgage
loan ownership throughout the life of the loan, and not just at the
point foreclosure is initiated. Obviously, a system relying on
electronic document images, or on a database, would need adequate
safeguards to insure accuracy and to justify its use as an authoritative
determinant of mortgage loan ownership.

A similar proposal for a federal clearinghouse with this information is made
in David P. Weber, The Magic of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System: It
available at
manuscript),
(unpublished
Isn't
(2011)
Is
and
It
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1898306.
128
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B. Merge the Note andMortgage into a Single Document and
. Execute Transfers by Single Assignment
The first and most obvious step in moving to a reliable and
authoritative electronic system protecting lenders, borrowers,
assignees and other parties to property title is to combine the note and
mortgage into a single instrument, with the full image of the
instrument and all later modifications to its parties and terms updated
in a single electronic registry. Such a system would promptly
eliminate the issues created when the note and mortgage travel on
different paths, or appear to do so. The details of regulation of such a
registry, which could conceivably evolve from the current MERS
database, are beyond the scope of this article, but necessarily would
include some sort of public audit and methods for interested parties to
correct errors, akin to the Fair Credit Reporting Act's provisions for
consumer reports. 2 9
The primary reason to have separate Note and Mortgage
documents has been the need to preserve negotiability of the note and
the possibility for a note buyer to become a holder in due course.
Article 3 of the UCC protects certain note holders from personal
claims and defenses of the borrower in order to promote the easy sale
of notes, but only on the condition that the note be stripped of most
ancillary contractual promises that are essential to a mortgage
transaction, such as promises to insure and maintain the property. The
solution to preserve negotiability while gaining the security of real
property collateral was to create two separate documents, the
negotiable note and the non-negotiable mortgage.
As Dale Whitman, Kurt Eggert and Ronald Mann have all
persuasively argued, the relevance of negotiability of mortgage notes
has been largely lost over the course of the twentieth century.130 The
secondary market for mortgages is highly liquid, and does not seem
to depend on the holder in due course doctrine to any great extent,
and in fact borrowers are harmed by the doctrine.' 3 1 The liability of
mortgage loan assignees is now governed in many cases by separate
consumer protection statutes, like the Truth in Lending Act. 32
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (providing procedures to correct erroneous credit
report information).
130 Whitman, supra note 14; Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Codification
and the Victory ofForm Over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 363, 368-74 (2002); Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in
Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REv. 951, 969-73 (1997).
131 Whitman, supra note 14.
132 Kathleen Engel & Thomas James Fitzpatrick IV, Complexity,
Complicity,
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The note/mortgage document could also be greatly simplified,
based on consumer testing and research by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. To insure the authenticity of the authoritative
document, the full document image should be transmitted in a short
time after the transaction to the registry, and should be available for
free inspection by the lender, the borrower, the title insurer and any
other appropriate party. It might still be possible to maintain some
minimal degree of privacy by restricting access to parties with a
genuine need to inspect the document, or the decision could be made
that mortgage/notes should be fully public. Enabling legislation
would require that any changes in parties (lender, borrower, or
servicer) be promptly submitted to the registry as a condition of their
enforcement. To put it another way, no foreclosure of the mortgage
could occur except when initiated by and against the currently
registered parties to the mortgage/note. There is no particular reason
foreclosure could not be initiated in the name of the servicer, on
condition that it acted as a disclosed agent for the disclosed investor
and principal. Nor would there ever be any reason to bring
foreclosures in the name of the registry, a regrettable practice
promoted by MERS that has led to nothing but chaos in the courts.
CONCLUSION
Massive origination of mortgage loans relying on the sell-todistribute model, followed by massive foreclosures, has led to chaos
in the legal processes to track who may foreclose and sell homes. As
mortgage industry participants struggled to keep up with the
paperwork and resorted to robo-signing, wide gaps appeared in the
chains of loan ownership. Some of the paper gaps can be filled and
some cannot. Courts have been shocked at bank practices, but are
probably unwilling to issue decisions that will void titles on a vast
scale. On the other hand, they are perfectly willing to delay
foreclosures when homeowners point out the gaps. There are no
quick solutions for legislators or regulators to rescue the industry
from its mess. While some legal issues are being settled, many other
legal questions must wind their way through the courts, including
those raised as a result of the widespread use of MERS as a recording
proxy. A transition from paper to electronic note/mortgage transfers
could solve many problems going forward, but it will not clear the
foreclosure backlog, nor will it clarify the muddied titles that are one
and Liability Up the SecuritizationFood Chain: Investor and ArrangerExposure to
Consumer Claims, HARv. Bus. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012).
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of the legacies of the 2007 crisis.
APPENDIX 1: MERS LOAN OWNERSHIP REPORTING
Figure 1: MERS "Milestones" printout tracking ownership of
mortgage in MERS v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289 (Me. 2010) (MERS
mortgage originated and securitized in 2006, foreclosure filed in
February 2009 in the name of MERS, 2009 note allonge endorsed by
Accredited produced after foreclosure filed, together with MERS
assignment to Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Bank trustee later substituted
as plaintiff):
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Figure 2: MERS loan search web page screenshot (May 26,
2011), in response to query based on MERS identification number
("MIN"), no investor disclosed:

1 record matched your search:
Need help?
MIN: 1002237-0110410402-3
Servicer:

Note Date: 10/29/2004

Wells Farao Home Mortuace a Divislon of Wells Faroo Bank NA

MINStatus: Inactive
Phone: (651) 605-3711

Minneapols, MN
Investor: This investor has chosen not to display their Information. Forassistance, please contact the servicer.

Retumnto Searc
For more Information aboutMERS
pleasego to www.mersinco

APPENDIX 2 - THE MERS/CoURT RECORD SURVEY
Between April and August 2011 we searched on-line court
dockets for judicial foreclosures filed in the name of Deutsche Bank,
Bank of New York and Wells Fargo Bank, primarily but not
exclusively filed as trustee for securitization trusts. These three banks
served as trustee in a large number of non-GSE securitizations of
mortgages prior to the 2008 foreclosure crisis, and thus we would
expect to see multiple mortgage transfers in those cases. We
examined court dockets, and where available, complaints, to
determine the identity of plaintiff and alleged chain of mortgage
ownership. Records were obtained from fourteen counties in six
states (Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas). Sixty
percent of the records were from Cuyahoga County Ohio
(Cleveland.)
We then searched on-line county property records to identify
the original mortgagee and any recorded assignments. (The sample
counties were selected based on the availability of electronic court
and property records.) In any case where MERS had a record interest
(forty-nine percent of all cases), we searched the MERS ID public
web page and recorded the investor and servicer. To match the
foreclosure to a MERS ID, we used the MERS loan identification
number when available from the property record (the image of the
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original mortgage, typically) or attachments to the foreclosure
complaint; otherwise we searched MERS for the property
owner/defendant name and property address. Because of differences
in address designations, common names, and other typical searching
problems, MERS IDs may in a small number of instances have
produced erroneous results, for example by locating a second
mortgage or other unrelated mortgage in the MERS system that was
not the same as the mortgage involved in the foreclosure.
During the study period it was possible to search MERS
records to identify both the servicer and the "investor" at
https://www.mers-servicerid.org/sis/search. At some point in August
or September 2011 MERS stopped permitting public searches for the
mortgage investor, restricting access to individual mortgage
borrowers by requiring entry of borrower personal identifying
information for each query. As a result our sampling was cut short
and is unbalanced in the ways previously mentioned. It can best be
described as a convenience sample.
Out of 396 cases, 357, or ninety percent, had matching
foreclosure plaintiffs and record mortgagees or assignees. Thus, the
county property records and foreclosure filings seemed to be
generally consistent, albeit with a significant ten percent error rate. It
appears that in most of the counties we studied, courts required the
plaintiff to be the mortgage assignee of record, and that foreclosure
firms were relatively diligent in getting facially compliant
assignments recorded, although some were recorded after the
foreclosure filing, and may have been signed by MERS assistant vice
presidents, improperly notarized, or had other defects.
The MERS records, on the other hand, showed a match
between the "investor" in the MERS database and the foreclosure
plaintiff in only twenty-three of 195 cases, i.e. twelve percent of the
MERS cases. The MERS database identified the investor as "not
disclosed" in 105 of those cases, Fannie Mae in.twenty-four cases,
and another non-matching investor in the remaining forty-four cases.
Case summaries from court and deed recorder records often
truncate the plaintiff's name, so that for example Bank of New York
Trust Co., Trustee for First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2005-FF-5
may appear as BANK OF NEW YORK. We treated any designation
of the correct trustee as a match, despite the failure to identify the
specific trust in either the foreclosure complaint or the MERS
records. As a result we probably overestimate the match rates. We
also disregarded differences between different subsidiaries of the
same bank holding company, so that for example we treated a case
with Wells Fargo Bank, NA as the plaintiff and Wells Fargo Home
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Mortgage, Inc. as the record mortgage assignee as a match, although
strictly speaking it is not. MERS allowed its members the option
whether or not to disclose the "investor", and in fifty percent of the
cases the investor was "not disclosed." Those cases were treated as
not matching. The twenty-four cases in which Fannie Mae is the
MERS identified investor may be correct, because the bank plaintiff
may in fact have been servicing those loans for Fannie Mae. We did
not take the extra step of checking the loans on the Fannie Mae
lookup site because of the lapse of time from many of the
foreclosures.
We found only eight cases in which MERS was the current
record mortgage holder or assignee. Of course the selection criteria
were that foreclosures were filed in the name of the trustee bank and
not in the name of MERS. Generally speaking in .the counties we
examined plaintiffs were obtaining assignments from MERS to the
foreclosure plaintiff and recording those assignments, usually but not
always prior to the foreclosure.
Table 1 - Current Mortgage "investor" According to MERS
MERS "Investor:" FC Plaintiff = Wells Fargo, Deutsche Bank
I
or Bank of New York
Valid
Frequency Percent Percent
1
0.5
0.3
AHM Acceptance, Inc.
0.5
1
0.3
Aurora Bank FSB
1
2
0.5
BAC Home Loan Servicing LP
BAC Home Loans Servicing
0.5
0.3
LP
0.5
1
Bank of America, NA
Bank of America, National
0.5
0.3
Association
3.1
Bank of New York Mellon NA
1.5
1
0.5
Barclays Bank PLC
0.5
0.3
Countrywide Bank FSB
0.5
0.3
Credit Suisse First Boston LLC
Deutche Bank National Trust
0.5
0.3
Company as Trustee
Deutsche Bank National Co as
0.5
0.3
Trustee
Deutsche Bank National Trust
1
2.1
Co as Trustee
4
-
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Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company
Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company as Trustee
EMC Mortgage Corporation
EMC Mortgage LLC
Encore Credit Corp.
Fannie Mae
FDIC as Receiver for
Washington Mutual Bank
Federal Home Loan Bank of
Chicago, as MPF
Home Vest LLC
HSBC Mortgage Services
Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc.
JP Morgan Chase Bank as
Trustee
JP Morgan Chase Bank NA
MetLife Home Loans, a
Division MetLife Bank, N.A
Morgan Stanley Mortgage
Capital Holdings, LLC
Not disclosed
Novastar Mortgage, Inc.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
PHH Mortgage Corporation
The Bank of New York Mellon
The Bank of New York
Mellon, N.A.
The Bank of New York
Mellon, N.A. as Trustee
UBS Real Estate Securities,
Inc
Universal American Mortgage
Company, LLC
Unknown
Vericrest Financial, Inc.
WMC Mortgage Corporation
Total MERS cases
Not MERS mortgage
Total cases
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1

0.3

0.5

4
1
1
1
24

1.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
6.1

2.0
0.5
0.5
0.5
12.3

2

0.5

1

1
1
2
1

0.3
0.3
0.5
0.3

0.5
0.5
1
0.5

5
1

1.3
0.3

2.6
0.5

1

0.3

0.5

2
105
1
1
1
1

0.5
26.5
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3

1
53.8
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5

3

0.8

1.5

2

0.5

1

1

0.3

0.5

0.3
1
0.5
0.3
49.2
50.8
100

0.5
2.1
1
0.5
100

1
4
2
1
195
201
396

